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VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
DEFINITION, COMPARISON, AND APPLICATION OF THE





The Workmen's Compensation Act of Pennsylvania1 is "an act defin-
ing liability of an employer to pay damages for injuries received by an
employee in the course of employment; establishing an elective schedule
of compensation; providing procedure for the determination of liability
and compensation thereunder;. and prescribing penalties."'2 In most Ameri-
can jurisdictions and in England compensation for disability is conditioned
upon the requisite that it be due to an accidental injury arising out of and
in the course of the claimant employee's employment.3 Pennsylvania, North
Dakota, Texas, and Washington are exceptions to this in that their sole
statutory requirement is that the accidental injury occur "in the course of
employment." 4 Utah uses the disjunctive "or" instead of the conjunctive
"and" between the phrases "arising out of" and "in course of." 5 The
Wisconsin statute is worded "growing out of and incidental to" the




DISTINCTION BETWEEN "ARISING OUT OF" AND
"IN THE COURSE OF"
In jurisdictions demanding that the accidental injury "arise out of"
and "in the course of," these two elements are not synonymous but are
used conjunctively; and neither alone is sufficient for recovery.8 In defining
these terms, most jurisdictions hold that the term "arise out of" relates to
the origin or cause of the accident, 9 or when the risk of such an occurrence
is reasonably incident to employment'0 and such risk might have been
1. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77 (1952).
2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77 § 1 (1952).
3. See Shatto v. Bardinet Exports, 170 Pa. Super. 16, 84 A.2d 388 (1951);
Shindledecker v. Borough of New Bethlehem, 145 Pa. Super. 77, 20 A.2d 867 (1941).
Note: Definition of the term "accident" is also open to a number of interpretations.
See Obrzut v. Borough of Olyphant, 200 Pa. Super. 241, 188 A.2d 764 (1963).
4. 6 SCHNgwsR, WORKMAN'S COMPeNSATION LAW, § 1542 (3d ed. 1948).
5. UTAAH CODS ANN. § 35-1-44(5) (1953).
6. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 102.03(1) (c) (1958). The phrases "growing out of" and
"incidental to" have been interpreted by Wisconsin Courts as meaning "arising out of"
and "in the course of." See Armstrong v. Indust. Comm'n, 254 Wis. 174, 35 N.W.2d
212 (1948) ; Munson v. Indust. Comm'n, 248 Wis. 192, 21 N.W.2d 265 (1946).
7. WYo. STAT. § 27-50 (1957).
8. Gelbart v. N.J. Federated Egg Producer's Ass'n, 17 N.J. Misc. 185, 7 A.2d
636 (1939).
9. Gilligan v. Int'l Paper Co., 24 N.J. 230, 131 A.2d 503 (1957).
10. Burton v. Bd. of Educ., Borough of Verona, 21 N.J. Misc. 108, 31 A.2d 337
(1943). See 6 SCHNgIMR, op. cit. supra note 4.
[VOL. 10
1
Luchsinger: Definition, Comparison, and Appliation of the In The Course Of Em
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1965
SPRING 1965]
contemplated by a reasonable man.11 The term "in the course of" relates
to the time, place, and circumstances of the accident. 12 One jurisdiction
has stated the distinction between these terms to be
• . . that in order for an accident to arise out of the employment a
more definite and closer causal relationship is required than is neces-
sary for an accident to arise in the course of the employment, but in
the latter a closer relationship must exist as to time and place and as
to the nature and type of work being performed. In other words, the
requirement that the accident arise in the course of the employment
is satisfied if it occurs while the employee is rendering service to his
employer which he was hired to do or something incidental thereto,
at the time when and the place where he was authorized to render
such service.' 3
III.
PROBLEM OF DEFINING TERM "IN TIHE COURSE OF"
A great deal has been written in an attempt to define and apply the
simple statutory requirement, "in the course of employment," which has
been described as one of the most difficult problems in connection with
claims for compensation.1 4 It has been acknowledged that no exact formula
can be stated which will be determinative of every case, and whether a
given accident is so related or incident to the business must depend upon
its own particular circumstances. The question is frequently a close oneY
Although it is acknowledged that one should not apply a technical meaning
to the words "in the course of employment" and that it was the legisla-
ture's intention that they be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning,
the courts are still languishing in "a labyrinth of judicial utterances"' 6 and
lost in a "jungle of contradictions.'
' I7
To predict with any accuracy what effect this term will have in
determining one's chances of an award, it is important to have a concept
of the overall purpose of the act and how this influences the authorities'
definition. The remedial and humanitarian nature of the act have often
been expressed.
Viewed in its entirety it is essentially a humanitarian measure
motivated by a desire to afford workmen a medium of protection
against the economic consequences of industrial accidents. These acci-
dents and the economic privations emanating from them represent an
unavoidable concomitant of an industrial society. The workman is
11. Clegg v. Motor Fin. Corp., 20 N.J. Misc. 437, 28 A.2d 533 (1942).
12. 6 SCHNEIDER, op. cit. supra note 15, at § 1542(b).
13. M & K Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 112 Utah 488, 493, 189 P.2d 132, 134 (1948).
14. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 288 I11. 126, 123 N.E.
278 (1919).
15. Cudahay Packing v. Parramore, 263 U.S. 418 (1923) ; Spry v. Polt, 186 Pa.
Super. 326, 142 A.2d 484 (1958) ; Rybitski v. Lebowitz, 175 Pa. Super. 265, 104 A.2d
161 (1954).
16. Kansas City Fiber Box Co. v. Connell, 5 F.2d 398, 400 (8th Cir. 1925).
17. In re Betts, 66 Ind. App. 484, 494, 118 N.E. 551, 554 (1918). "We can no
more follow them (the definitions) than one can follow all the roads. In every contest
it is an easy matter to arrange a long list of cases. .. ."
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not normally in a position to shoulder the burden as it affects himself
and his family, and resort to the remedies of the common law revealed
glaring inadequacies in their efficacy as a protective instrument. Since
the genesis of the problem is the industrial type economy, it was
thought appropriate that the burden be borne by industry and perhaps
ultimately by the consuming public. Such a price is not too high to
pay for the supposed benefits derived from modern industry. The act
was intended to accomplish this objective of cloaking the workman with
a protective mantle by placing the risk of loss in the first instance upon
the direct recipient of the worker's efforts - Industry.'5
IV.
ANALYSIS OF DEFINITION OF THE TERM IN PENNSYLVANIA
Of the four states whose statutes require only that the accident occur
"in the course of" the employment, North Dakota provides that the
accident or disease be fairly traceable to the employment. 19 Texas, though
referring only to accidents occurring "in the course of employment,"
20
has required by its decisional law that the injury arise out of and be
received in the course of employment, neither alone being sufficient.
21
Washington uses the term "in the course of" 22 but interprets it to mean
also "arising out of."
'23
Whereas the other three states which require only that the injury
be "in the course" have in their decisions also required either explicitly
or impliedly that it arise "out of," 24 Pennsylvania has not gone so far.
Indeed, the decisions state explicitly that such injury need not arise out of,
but only in the course of.25 That part of the act which concerns this
problem reads as follows:
... the term "injury by an accident in the course of his employ-
ment" as used in this article shall not include an injury caused by an
act of a third person intended to injure the employe because of reasons
personal to him, and not directed against him as an employe or
because of his employment; but shall include all other injuries sustained
18. Girardi v. Pa. Power & Light Co., 174 F. Supp. 813, 816 (E.D. Pa. 1959),
aff'd, Girardi v. Lipsett, 275 F.2d 492. See 1 SKINNER, PENNSYLVANIA WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION LAW 14-35 (4th ed. 1947). See also Taylor v. Ewing, 166 Pa. Super.
21. 70 A.2d 456 (1950) ; Smrekar v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 137 Pa. Super. 183,
8 A.2d 461 (1939).
19. N.D. CENTURY CODE ANN. § 65-01-02(8) (1960).
20. CIVIL STAT. STATE oF Tnx. ANN. art. 8309 § 1 (1959). Statute defines injury
as one ". . . having to do with and originating in the work, business, trade, or pro-
fession of the employer received by the employee while engaged in or about the further-
ance of the affairs or business of his employer, whether upon the employer's premises
or elsewhere." It has been suggested that this is another way of saying "arising out of."
See 6 SCHNEIDER, op. cit. supra note 4.
21. See Vasper v. Tex. Employer's Ins. Ass'n, 206 S.W.2d 646 (Ct. Civ. App. 1947).
22. REv. CODS WASH. ANN. § 51.08.013 (1961). "Acting in the course of employ-
ment" means the workman acting at his employer's direction or in the furtherance of
his employer's business.
23. See 6 SCHNEIDER, op. cit. supra note 4.
24. 6 SCHNEIDER, op. cit. supra note 4.
25. See Mitchell v. Holland Furnace Co., 189 Pa. Super. 82, 149 A.2d 662 (1959)
Elliott v. Delmont Fuel Co., 183 Pa. Super. 13, 127 A.2d 777 (1957) ; Weiss v.
Friedman's Hotel, 176 Pa. Super. 98, 106 A.2d 867 (1954).
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while the employe is actually engaged in the furtherance of the business
or affairs of the employer, whether upon the employer's premises or
elsewhere, and shall include all injuries caused by the condition of
the premises or by the operation of the employer's business or affairs
thereon, sustained by the employe, who though not so engaged, is
injured upon the premises occupied by or under the control of the
employer, or upon which the employer's business or affairs are being
carried on, the employe's presence thereon being required by the nature
of his employment.2 6
In cases where there is no dispute as to the essential facts,27 the
question as to whether a person was in the course of his employment or
was actually engaged in furtherance of business or affairs of the employer
at the time of the injury is one of law,28 and in resolving it each case
must be determined in the light of specific facts29 and circumstances 0 of
the employment. In trying to understand any approach to this problem,
there are three well established propositions which should be kept in mind:
(1) the Workmen's Compensation Act is a remedial statute and is to
receive a liberal construction,31 (2) findings of fact by the compensation
board if supported by substantial evidence are binding upon the appellate
court,3 2 and (3) on appeal from an award the evidence must be received
in the most favorable light to the claimant.
33
In an attempt to find a limiting factor or factors with respect to such
a liberal compensation statute, it is necessary to turn to the case law. It
has been held that an injury in the course of employment embraces all
injuries received by the employee while engaged in furthering the business
of the employer. Injuries received on the premises are subject to the
following limitations: (1) the employee's presence must ordinarily be
required at the place of injury3 4 or (2) if not so required,3 5 the departure
from the usual place of employment must not amount to an abandonment
of employment3 6 or be an act wholly foreign3 7 to his usual work. An
26. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77 § 411.
27. Spry v. Polt, 186 Pa. Super. 326, 142 A.2d 484 (1958).
28. Dupree v. Barney, 193 Pa. Super. 331, 163 A.2d 901 (1960) ; Kramer v. City
of Philadelphia, 179 Pa. Super. 129, 116 A.2d 280 (1955) ; Rybitski v. Lebowitz, 175
Pa. Super. 265, 104 A.2d 161 (1954). Findings of fact by the compensation board if
supported by substantial evidence are binding upon the appellate court.
29. Ristine v. Moore, 190 Pa. Super. 610, 155 A.2d 456 (1959); Dunphy v.
Augustinian College of Villanova, 129 Pa. Super. 262, 195 Alt. 782 (1937).
30. Hiles v. Hecla Coal & Coke Co., 296 Pa. 34, 145 Atl. 603 (1929) ; Hopwood
v. City of Pittsburgh, 152 Pa. Super. 398, 33 A.2d 658 (1943).
31. Pater v. Superior Steel Co., 263 Pa. 244, 106 Atl. 202 (1919) ; Keim v. Burk-
holder & Johnson, 182 Pa. Super. 460, 127 A.2d 752 (1956).
32. Ibid.
33. Eberle v. Union Dental Co., 182 Pa. Super. 519, 128 A.2d 136, aff'd, 390 Pa.
112, 134 A.2d 559 (1957).
34. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77 § 411 (1952).
35. Henry v. Lit Bros., 193 Pa. Super. 543, 165 A.2d 406 (1960) ; Geibel v. Paoli
Area High School Sys., 9 Chest. Co. Rep. 201 (Pa. 1959).
36. Dupree v. Barney, 193 Pa. Super. 331, 163 A.2d 901 (1960) ; Kramer v. City
of Philadelphia, 179 Pa. Super. 129, 116 A.2d 280 (1955).
37. Weiss v. Friedman's Hotel, 176 Pa. Super. 98, 106 A.2d 867 (1954); Haas v.
Brotherhood of Transp. Workers, 158 Pa. Super. 291, 44 A.2d 776 (1945); Adams
v. Colonial Colliery Co., 104 Pa. Super. 187, 158 Ati. 183 (1932).
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incident necessary to constitute a break in the continuity or course of
employment must be of pronounced character38 and a slight and temporary
departure from work and administering to employee's personal comforts
or conveniences does not break the course of employment.3 9 The fact that
the employee was not actually performing work at the instant he was
injured is not controlling in determining whether vel non he was in the
course of employment, so long as he was occupying himself consistently
with his contract of employment and in a manner reasonably incidental
thereto.40 This requirement that the employee occupy himself consistently
and in a manner reasonably incidental to his contract is the closest Pennsyl-
vania Boards and Courts have come to requiring that the injury arise out
of the employment.41 However, this requirement is not applied in all
cases. It is submitted that if this limitation were used and strictly inter-
preted, it would be equivalent to the term "arise out of."
V.
DEFINITION MODIFIED WITH RESPECT TO TRAVELING WORKER
With respect to the traveling worker not on the premises, it has
been held that the course of employment is necessarily broader than with
respect to an ordinary employee.42 Such injury occurring off the premises
of the employer is compensable when the employee is actually engaged in
furthering the business or affairs of his employer rather than constructively
engaged therein, 43 but the phrase "course of employment" must be given
more liberal construction than in the case of employment to be performed
on the employer's premises.44 However, at least one court in this state
has required that if one is injured off the premises of the employer in an
act not connected with the employer's business it must appear that the
employer ordered or directed the act, since mere permission to the employee
to do the act without directing or ordering its performance will not support
38. White v. Morris, 182 Pa. Super. 454, 127 A.2d 748 (1956); Conley v.
Pittsburgh Coal Co., 157 Pa. Super. 567, 43 A.2d 605 (1945); Haas v. Brotherhood
of Transp. Workers, 158 Pa. Super. 291, 44 A.2d 776 (1945).
39. Mitchell v. Holland Furnace Co., 189 Pa. Super. 82, 149 A.2d 662 (1959)
Geibel v. Paoli Area High School Sys., 9 Chest. Co. Rep. 201 (Pa. 1959).
40. Muir v. Wilson Coal Co., 33 Northumb. Leg. Jour. 9 (Pa. 1960), aff'd, 194
Pa. Super. 487, 168 A.2d 588 (1961) ; Elliott v. Delmont Fuel Co., 183 Pa. Super. 13,
127 A.2d 777 (1957) ; Kramer v. City of Philadelphia, 179 Pa. Super. 129, 116 A.2d
280 (1955).
41. Compare with note 15, supra. New Jersey defines the term "out of employ-
ment" to mean that the accident must have been due to a risk which might have been
contemplated by a reasonable person as incidental to the employment and that such
risk is incidental to the employment when it is connected with the employee's obligation
under his contract.
42. Wolfingbarger v. Addressograph-Multigraph Corp., 188 Pa. Super. 136, 146
A.2d 309 (1958).
43. French v. Coff Decorators, 199 Pa. Super. 482, 185 A.2d 646 (1962) ; Miller v.
Schiffner, 196 Pa. Super. 84, 173 A.2d 707 (1961).
44. Mitchell v. Holland Furnace Co., 189 Pa. Super. 82, 149 A.2d 662 (1959).
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an award. 45 Even where the injured employee has voluntarily performed
a service off the premises after working hours and where such service is
part of the contract, although mainly for the convenience of the employee,
Pennsylvania courts have required a positive direction or order by the
employer for recovery. 4  It must be noted that the peculiar duties and
relations of a traveling salesman in securing orders for his employer47 are
not to be generally extended and applied to other kinds of employment.
48
True, the roving nature of such employment, the discretion allowed
with reference to hours and methods, sometimes give this employment
an elasticity not found in others where activities are more circum-
scribed. But it will be found in every case where an award has been
upheld that the salesman was engaged in an act by direction of his
employer, express or implied, and not merely for his own convenience.
Being a salesman does not change an activity not in the course of
employment to one that is.
4 9
VI.
"IN THE COURSE OF" REQUIREMENT AS APPLIED
IN "CLOSE CASES"
In applying these requirements to cases involving traveling workers,50
the courts are faced with interpreting the already liberal Workmen's
Compensation Act even more liberally, and as the following cases will show,
perhaps to the abandonment of any limitation whatsoever upon the term
"in the course of employment." In the case of Mitchell v. Holland Furnace
Co., a workmen's compensation claim was brought on behalf of the widow
and minor children of the deceased employee. The decedent was working
as a door-to-door salesman soliciting orders for furnaces. He and an
assistant sales engineer for the employer were working alternate sides of
a street. The decedent finished his side of the street and met his partner
at the home of a prospective customer where the sales engineer remarked
45. Mitchell v. Argeros & Co., 61 Lack. Juris. 137 (Pa. 1959); cf. Gibson v.
Blowers Paint Serv., 140 Pa. Super. 216, 14 A.2d 154 (1940) ; Palko v. Taylor-McCoy
Coal & Coke Co., 289 Pa. 401, 137 Atl. 625 (1927).
46. Anetakis v. Salvation Army, 191 Pa. Super. 268, 156 A.2d 590 (1960); Haley
v. City of Philadelphia, 107 Pa. Super. 405, 163 At!. 917 (1933).
47. Chase v. Emery Mfg. Co., 271 Pa. 265, 113 At!. 840 (1921).
48. Holdsworth v. Pa. Power & Light Co., 337 Pa. 235, 10 A.2d 412 (1940). But
see, Hadfield v. Am. Soc. of Composers, Authors & Publishers, 174 Pa. Super. 394,
101 A.2d 423 (1953).
49. Litus v. S. E. Sostmann & Co., 133 Pa. Super. 201, 209, 2 A.2d 580, 583-84
(1938). However, the court in Mitchell v. Holland Furnace Co., 189 Pa. Super. 82,
149 A.2d 662 (1959), apparently took exception to this statement. A comparison of
these two cases shows the evolution of the liberal approach especially with resepct
to traveling workers.
50. Courts have extended this liberal approach to occupations other than salesmen
to include deliverymen, investigators, servicemen, policemen, surveyors, and others.
See Susman v. Kaufmann's Dept. Store, 182 Pa. Super. 467, 128 A.2d 173 (1957);
Kramer v. City of Philadelphia, 179 Pa. Super. 129, 116 A.2d 280 (1955) ; Elliot v.
Delmont Fuel Co., 37 West. 175 (Pa. 1956), aff'd, 183 Pa. Super. 13, 127 A.2d 777;
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about a "loaded" cherry tree in the yard. They requested permission to
pick some cherries and such was granted. The decedent commenced to
climb the tree by means of a ladder, and while standing on a limb of the
tree fell to the ground, sustaining a fractured skull from which he died
while on the way to the hospital. The Workmen's Compensation Board
granted the award whereupon the employer and the insurance carrier
appealed; the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County affirmed,
as did the Superior Court of Pennsylvania on further appeal. It is sub-
mitted that this case must represent the most liberal definition of "in the
course" that anyone could imagine. One could certainly not apply the
reasonable man standard and arrive at such an outrageous and illogical
conclusion, but note that it represents the essence of humanitarianism. In
this case, the court reasoned that decedent's work as a canvasser or travel-
ing salesman was principally off-premises employment and therefore the
term "course of employment" must be given a more liberal construction
than where the employment is to be performed on the premises. It was of
the opinion that the evidence supported the finding and conclusion of the
Workmen's Compensation Board which was as follows:
The board's finding that the accident occurred in the course of
employment is abundantly supported by the evidence on one of two
theories: (1) Decedent's act of cherry picking on the premises of
defendant's customer and in the presence of defendant's assistant sales
manager was an integral part of decedent's sales duties and functions.
It is the salesman's duty to gain the attention and favor of a pros-
pective customer (cite omitted). The board has found that decedent's
act was incidental to his primary task of selling. We cannot lightly
dismiss the logic of such conclusion; (2) Even if decedent's act of
cherry picking is not construed to be part of his employment, it never-
the less constitutes such a slight departure as not to break the course
of employment. 1
Is not such a conclusion beyond one's comprehension or can it be
explained? The abundant evidence which the board and the court refer to
in support of this decision disappears when the question is posed: If picking
cherries from a tree while employed as a furnace salesman does not con-
stitute an act of abandonment which is wholly foreign to the employment,
what does? Realistically, was this merely a trivial, inconsequential break
from the employment? Was it reasonably incidental to the employee's
duties; was this act perforned at the express or implied direction of his
employer ?52 This was obviously for the convenience of the employee.
53
Picking cherries could hardly be an activity in the course of selling
furnaces.5 4 The commission and the court in this instance have seemingly
abandoned any limitation upon the term "course of employment."
51. Mitchell v. Holland Furnace Co., 189 Pa. Super. 82, 87-8, 149 A.2d 662,
665 (1959).
52. Cases cited note 44, mpra.
53. Davis v. Dahl Motors, Inc., 27 Lehigh Law Jour. 466 (Pa. 1957).
54. Litus v. S. E. Sostmann & Co., supra note 47.
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In Hadfield v. American Society of Composers, Authors & Pub-
lishers,5 5 a similarly liberal decision was reached. The claimant, widow
of decedent, filed petition for workmen's compensation on behalf of her-
self and minor child. The decedent was an investigator employed by the
American Society of Composers, Authors & Publishers and worked out
of their Philadelphia office. As an investigator it was his duty to visit
various restaurants, cafes and taprooms for the purpose of determining
whether or not the music and entertainment furnished in these establish-
ments was licensed by his employer. His territory was Eastern Pennsyl-
vania and Delaware. He worked when it was appropriate for him to make
such investigations, and he was supplied with a company car. The
decedent, along with a fellow investigator while making a special investi-
gation, had dinner with a young lady whom the decedent had met during
the course of an investigation concluded just prior to the accident. Shortly
after 7 p.m. the decedent, accompanied by the young lady, went to the
garage where his company car was stored and there by chance met his
superior, who expressed his disapproval when informed that Hadfield
intended to take the young lady home and cautioned him not to do so again.
Both Hadfield and the young lady lived in the same general area, West
Philadelphia. On the way to the young lady's home the car skidded and
struck a pole, killing Hadfield. The board found that decedent was actually
engaged in the course of business at the time of the accident, since he was
operating a company car, and that since defendant could not prove Hadfield
was not working it must be assumed that the decedent was intending to
continue with his employment that evening. The board granted the award
and the court on appeal affirmed holding that "findings based on proper
inferences must be sustained. Assuming that the evidence also permitted
an inference that deceased was engaged on a mission of his own, the infer-
ence to be adopted was for the compensation authorities."56 The court
observed that since the board found in favor of the widow and minor child,
the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the claimant
and claimant must be given the benefit of every inference reasonably deduc-
tible therefrom.5 7 The controlling inferences are as follows: (1) since the
bars in the area did not close until 2 a.m., the decedent could have made
further investigations, (2) he worked no specified hours or specified places,
(3) he customarily worked Friday nights and therefore it was reasonable
to infer that this was his intention on the night of his death, and (4) it was
reasonable to infer that he was on his way home at the time. It was found
that these inferences were fairly deductible from the facts. The court made
mention of the fact that to be a break in the continuity of employment such
55. 174 Pa. Super. 394, 101 A.2d 423 (1953).
56. Walden v. Williams Bros. Corp., 167 Pa. Super. 289, 292-93, 74 A.2d 762,
763 (1950).
57. Halloway v. Carnegie-Ill. Steel Corp., 173 Pa. Super. 137, 96 A.2d 171 (1953)
Darmopray v. Budd Mfg. Co., 169 Pa. Super. 200, 82 A.2d 341 (1951).
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activity must amount to an abandonment or something wholly foreign
thereto and that it is enough if the employee is occupying himself con-
sistently with his contract of employment in some manner reasonably
incidental to his employment.58
This ultra-liberal approach can be seen in cases in which the injury
occurred on the premises. In Geibel v. Paoli Area High School Sys.59
decedent's widow filed petition for workmen's compensation. Decedent
was employed by defendant school system as a custodian and on occasion
as directed performed some duties in connection with care and use of the
school's athletic fields which were located across a public highway from
the buildings in which the decedent was usually occupied with his custodial
duties. His hours of employment were from 9:30 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. On
the day of his death, at about 4:45 p.m., a violent electrical storm struck
the area. At this time the decedent received a telephone call from his wife
who was alone at home with their two children, one and two years of age.
The court also pointed out that the decedent's wife was six months'
pregnant with their third child who was born following the decedent's death.
His wife informed the decedent that she believed that their house had been
struck by lightning and that she desired he come home. The decedent's
home was approximately one mile away, and in walking this distance, he
walked across the school's athletic field. The decedent left at 5:00 p.m.
and was never seen alive again. The court reported in gory detail: " ...
his dead body was found lying face down on one of the athletic fields. He
had been struck and killed by lightning and the metal keys which he used
in his work were found on his person in a fused condition."60 The board
granted the award and it was affirmed by this court. In support of this
finding the court stated that the decedent died while pursuing a matter
of personal concern and there could be no recovery on the theory that he
was engaged in furthering the employer's business. However, the accident
occurred upon property under the custody and control of defendant. In
general, to be considered happening on the "premises" the accident must
have occurred on property owned, leased, or controlled by the employer
and so connected with the business in which the employer is engaged as to
form a component or integral part of it, and this is a question of law.61
The problem which is of concern here and which was considered by the
court is: Was the decedent's act one of abandonment or wholly foreign
to his employment? The finding that this was not the case was supported
by the following: (1) there was no evidence that decedent did not intend
to return to his job, since he could have returned within the time left
before 6:00 p.m., (2) it was just as reasonable to assume he would have
returned as to reach a contrary conclusion, and (3) a trivial and temporary
58. Conley v. Pittsburgh Coal Co., 157 Pa. Super. 567, 569, 43 A.2d 605, 607 (1945).
59. 9 Chest. Co. Rep. 201 (Pa. 1959).
60. Id. at 202.
61. Wolsko v. Am. Bridge Co., 158 Pa. Super. 339, 44 A.2d 873 (1946).
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departure for the employee's personal benefit or for serving others has been
held not to break the continuity of employment or prevent recovery for
accidental injury occurring on the employef's premises.62 However, it
should be noted that in the case cited such service was rendered to another
also on the premises. It has long been recognized that various acts by an
employee for his own benefit, "performance of which while at work are
reasonably necessary to his health and comfort:"03 and "reasonable, and
perhaps a necessary precaution to insure his peace of mind" 64 are not
considered abandonment. Here the court extended this to include the
decedent's ministration to his own peace of mind even though it necessi-
tated his leaving the premises and the performance of his contract. The
court looked to the departure as being innocent and inconsequential. It
was innocent in that it was for a good reason; but inconsequential it was
not, for to abandon means to leave or vacate, and it would appear the
decedent had done this. Despite this definition, the court concluded: "While
the facts differ from those in any case the industry of counsel and our own
research have developed, we are forced to the conclusion that decedent had
not abandoned his employment when he met his death while present on
premises occupied and controlled by his employer where he was required
by the nature of his employment to be." 65
In Henry v. Lit Bros.,66 the claimant, a porter or cleaner, was found
by the board to have been totally disabled as the result of an injury while
in the course of employment and was granted an award. Court of Common
Pleas and the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed. The claimant was
required to "sign in" and "sign out" for lunch hour, 12 noon to 1 p.m.
Behind the employer's store was a yard which was used by the employees
for various outdoor games; however, although the employer had knowl-
edge of this practice, he gave neither official permission nor any encourage-
ment. Adjacent to this yard were several loading platforms and a loading
platform in the process of construction. Vertical supports for this platform
extended eighteen to twenty-four inches from the ground. The claimant,
aware of this condition, while running for a "pass" tripped over a support,
somersaulted in the air, landed on the ground and broke his neck. The
principle established by the court was ". . . that the continuity of employ-
ment is not broken by engaging in play and recreation on the employer's
premises during lunch hour."'6 7 The court cites numerous "horseplay"
cases and includes the present case under the approach used in such cases.
62. Boyd v. Philmont Country Club, 129 Pa. Super. 135, 195 Atd. 156 (1937).
63. Weiss v. Friedinan's Hotel, 176 Pa. Super. 98, 101, 106 A.2d 867, 868 (1954).
64. Adams v. Colonial Colliery Co., 104 Pa. Super. 187, 190, 158 Atd. 183,
184 (1932).
65. Geibel v. Paoli Area High School Sys., 9 Chest. Co. 201, 206 (Pa. 1959).
66. 193 Pa. Super. 543, 165 A.2d 406 (1960).
67. Id. at 549, 165 A.2d at 409.
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The "horseplay" 68 cases present an excellent example of how liberal
the term "in the course of employment" has come to be applied. In Hall v.
Carnegie Institute of Technology, the decedent laboratory clerk took a
special policeman's revolver, which he thought to be unloaded, placed
it to his temple, pulled the trigger, discharged the "empty" gun and killed
himself. Commission and court found him to have been "in the course" of
his employment. 69 Although the decedent's presence was not required at
the place of the accident, his presence did not amount to an abandonment
of employment or constitute a departure wholly foreign to his usual work.
The court stated in support of such finding that the decedent was on the
employer's premises and that he had violated no positive orders and that
he was not violating the law at the time of the injury.
VII.
CONCLUSION
It is submitted that the definition and application of the term "in the
course" of employment is an area in which no single formula should be
applied, but one in which a number of rules or limitations are to be used.
These rules are to be liberally applied since the purpose of the act is to,
whenever possible, compensate and reimburse the accidentally injured em-
ployee, and it is only just that his employer, industry, and eventually the
public who benefit from his labors should bear this burden. In the majority
of cases the determination as to whether the injury was "in the course"
of employment is not difficult and the existing rules are adequate to dispose
of them, but there exists a body of cases to which the existing rules, even
though liberally applied, will not permit a reward. The cases heretofore
discussed are representative of this type of case. The employee in these
cases has been injured while doing an act which a reasonable man would
consider to be an abandonment of his employment and such acts are cer-
tainly foreign thereto. Why then do workmen's compensation boards and
courts allow rewards to be granted in these cases? Their liberal applica-
tion of the limiting requirements in many instances amounts to a complete
discarding of such requirements. These decisions are not ad hoc in the
true sense of the term, but there are basic factors which are present in all
of them which are considered and affect the decisions. Although not
specifically stated as such by the boards and courts who create the illusion
that the time tested and judicially recognized rules are still applied but
only more liberally than usual, these factors are as follows: (1) the
68. Sinko v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 104 Pa. Super. 357, 159 At. 230 (1932)
McCoy v. Spriggs, 102 Pa. Super. 500, 157 Atl. 523 (1931) ; Oldinsky v. Philadelphia
& Reading Coal & Iron Co., 92 Pa. Super. 328 (1928) ; Hale v. Savage Fire Brick
Co., 75 Pa. Super. 452 (1921).
69. Hall v. Carnegie Institute of Technology, 170 Pa. Super. 459, 87 A.2d 87 (1952).
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